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Civil Society amid Civil War: Political Violence and
Non-violence in the Burmese Democracy Movement
NICHOLAS HENRY
Research in the areas of global civil society and political violence has tended to reinforce a
dichotomy between the two in normative and descriptive terms. This paper uses a quali-
tative analysis of interviews with participants in both armed and non-armed groups in
the Burmese opposition movement to understand how armed struggle and non-violent
action operate in this context. In discussing the needs and strategies of their groups
and communities, participants demonstrated that armed and non-armed groups often
had more in common than is sometimes assumed. A range of viewpoints on political
violence existed across the groups, with many armed group members supporting peaceful
solutions and many members of non-violent organisations defending aspects of the
armed struggle. This paper argues that in view of the degree of overlap in the political
attitudes and experiences of armed and non-armed groups in the case study, both
categories of organisation should be considered as elements of global civil society.
This paper argues that a variety of attitudes and approaches towards violence and
non-violence exist within civil society. Whereas participants in global civil society
are often assumed to be non-violent by definition, this paper presents evidence
from a study of Burmese opposition movements to show a range of positions
on the use of violence. It further argues that the existence of differing political pos-
itions on violence does not represent a fundamental or unbridgeable division
between groups and does not prevent widespread co-operation between groups
ranging from those actively engaged in armed struggle to those with a principled
commitment to pacifism.
Theorists of global civil society have tended to associate the concept with a
commitment to non-violence. John Keane’s view of global civil society is that
“violence is anathema to its spirit and substance. This follows, by definition,
because global civil society is marked by a tendency to non-violence.”1 While
Keane’s assertion is broadly representative of the Liberal consensus on the
subject, not all theorists share the definition of civil society as a sphere of
non-violent voluntary association. Chandhoke has problematised the assump-
tions that civil society is non-violent and characterised by horizontal relationships
of trust. Taken together, these two assumptions render invisible the political
nature of resistance by oppressed groups and fail to recognise the inequalities
1. J. Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 145.
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of power that constitute the oppression in the first place.2 For marginalised or
oppressed groups to take advantage of the rights of civil society, such as the
right to organise a social movement or trade union, is in itself often a struggle
occasioning violent repression. In such situations, civil society is not experienced
as a neutral and peaceful realm of association, but rather as a set of unequal power
relations linked to economic class and enforced by state violence.3 In a similar
vein, Mitra argues from a comparative historical analysis of the development of
civil societies in India and in Europe that emerging civil societies in developing
states have always been characterised by political violence. From this perspective,
outbreaks of violent resistance are less a result of state failure and more a result of
social conflicts focused around a developing state. According to Mitra, the exist-
ence of violence in a developing civil society should not be seen as exceptional
but rather as a sign of underlying conflicts over political values and status.4
Many scholars of global civil society have promoted it as a field of practice
which can reinforce the governance roles of international organisations and
powerful states in the pursuit of international law and peace. Violence in all its
forms has been seen as a threat to global civil society, or as part of its “dark
side”.5 Global civil society in turn is seen as mobilising against war, with large-
scale anti-war protest showing “both the robust reality of global civil society,
and its current weakness as a challenge to geopolitical prerogatives”.6 Others
have gone further, claiming that owing to the expansion of global civil society
and of international law, “war, meaning violence between socially organised
groups, normally states, has become morally unjustifiable”.7 Kaldor has argued
elsewhere that Liberals since Kant have “envisaged the construction of a liberal
international order linked to the rise of domestic civil society, in which force
was increasingly limited to policing actions”.8 Kaldor identifies with this
Kantian tradition9 and emphasises that the conditions of liberal global governance
in politico-legal terms are co-constitutive with those of global civil society: “civil
society needs governance, a framework of rules and institutions for civil society
to function”, in particular the “extension and application of international humani-
tarian law (the ‘laws of war’) and human rights law”.10 Noting that laws need
enforcement, Kaldor advocates “humanitarian intervention” in the form of mili-
tary force which aims “not to defeat an enemy but to protect civilians and stabilise
war situations so that non-extremist tolerant politics has space to develop”.11
2. N. Chandhoke, The Conceits of Civil Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 61.
3. Ibid., pp. 207–220.
4. S.K. Mitra, “Collective Violence and the Making of Civil Society: India in European Perspective”,
Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, No. 19 (2003), available: ,http://www.ub.
uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/4129. (accessed 8 May 2008).
5. M. Albrow and H. Anheir, “Introduction: Violence and the Possibility of Global Civility”, in
M. Kaldor, M. Albrow, H. Anheier and M. Glasius (eds), Global Civil Society 2006/7 (London: Sage,
2007), p. 1.
6. R. Falk, “The Changing Role of Global Civil Society”, in G. Baker and D. Chandler (eds), Global
Civil Society: Contested Futures (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 76.
7. H. Ezzat and M. Kaldor, “Not Even a Tree: Deligitimising Violence and the Prospects for a
Pre-emptive Civility”, in Kaldor et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 19.
8. M. Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 36.
9. M. Kaldor, “The Idea of Global Civil Society”, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3 (2003), p. 583.
10. Kaldor, Global Civil Society, op. cit., p. 109.
11. Ibid., p. 128.
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Global civil society is thus seen as a civilising influence on state violence, not only
in preventing war but also in certain circumstances in legitimising state warfare
for humanitarian ends.
This pragmatic willingness to consider state violence as potentially legitimate is
not generally extended to non-state actors by theorists of global civil society. In
what Keane calls “uncivil war” the traditional rules of state warfare do not
apply as the anarchy of non-state violence is unleashed. While traditional civil
wars involve rival claimants to state power, uncivil war involves the breakdown
of state power, or in currently fashionable terms, state failure. The removal of the
state as the stable centre of conflict disturbs the familiar moral order, leading
Keane to warn that uncivil war operates “according to no rules except that of
destructiveness” as “sober restrictions covering the ground rules of war are
swept aside”.12 However, Keane does not provide evidence of state warfare
being conducted according to sober rules or a care to avoid destruction. While
uncivil wars are discussed in terms of periods of communal violence such as in
Rwanda and Bosnia, the term is broad enough to cover almost any non-state
violence. The only form of resistance that is explicitly exempted from the
definition of “uncivil society” is the non-violent civil disobedience of Thoreau
and Gandhi.13 Keane’s concept of uncivil war correlates with what Kaldor calls
“network war”, a supposedly new form of conflict involving “armed networks
of non-state and state actors”.14 The analysis of network war depicts non-state
armed groups in pejorative terms as terrorists, fanatics, criminals, mercenaries
and followers of charismatic leaders and warlords. Like Keane, Kaldor makes
use of the idea of “failed states” to explain how these groups exploit conditions
in which “the monopoly of legitimate organised violence is being eroded”.15 In
contrast to the potential for state violence to reinforce international norms,
non-state violence is seen as destabilising and necessarily contrary to the aims
of global civil society.
The view that civil society and violence are separate and contradictory has not
generally been challenged by theorists of political violence. Debates about the
causes of conflict and insurgency have tended not to engage with issues related
to civil society and social movements. However, in certain political contexts
there can be a great deal of overlap and engagement between armed groups
and their non-violent counterparts. In cases of protracted civil war, such as the
example of Burma examined in this paper, groups that would normally be a
part of non-violent civil society may be driven underground or feel compelled
to take up arms against the state. Conversely, where the state is unable to guaran-
tee security or is actively targeting civilians, non-state armed groups can play an
enabling role in safeguarding both political opposition and basic social services.16
This paper argues that there is more empirical overlap and less clear moral
12. J. Keane, Violence and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 117.
13. Ibid., p. 109, n. 1.
14. Kaldor, Global Civil Society, op. cit., p. 119.
15. Ibid., p. 120.
16. D. Biro, “The (Un)bearable Lightness of Violence: Warlords as an Alternative Form of Govern-
ance in the ‘Westphalian Periphery’”, in T. Debiel and D. Lambach (eds), State Failure Revisited II:
Actors of Violence and Alternative Forms of Governance (Duisberg-Essen: Institute for Development and
Peace, 2007).
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distinction between non-state armed groups and global civil society than has gen-
erally been assumed.
Theorists of political violence by non-state actors have often perpetuated the
dichotomy between the groups and practices they study and those which are
accepted as part of global civil society. While some studies have included non-
combatants as a control group for comparison with combatants17 and others
have explored the political experiences of militants prior to recruitment,18
studies have not generally taken account of relationships between armed and
non-armed political groups. Seidman makes a cogent argument, based on the
case of the ANC in South Africa, for paying more attention to the links between
groups and individuals engaged in armed struggle and legal forms of political
mobilisation. Based on personal experiences as a researcher and a review of exist-
ing literature, Seidman argues that such links are likely to be relevant in explain-
ing dynamics of armed group recruitment as well as the direct and indirect
influences of armed struggle on non-violent contentious politics.19
Method
Various methods have been used for empirical research into motivating factors in
political violence, each with their own benefits and drawbacks. Some researchers
have developed econometric models to explain armed activity over a large
number of cases.20 While such studies have been criticised for the practice of
proxying available data for complex variables21 the statistical method gives an
insight into motivating factors that can be generalised across a large number of
conflicts and allows other generalisations to be ruled out. However, such
studies can’t predict what combination of specific circumstances will be relevant
in initiating and fuelling a particular conflict. To answer this question, of critical
importance in finding sustainable solutions to civil conflict, there is no substitute
for in-depth empirical study of particular cases.
Motivations for participation in particular conflicts have been studied using
survey methods,22 allowing hypotheses in existing literature to be tested against
a large sample of respondents. The drawback of the survey method is that the
standardisation of questions does not leave room for the participants to respond
in their own words, meaning that important and potentially surprising infor-
mation might be missed. Other studies have used qualitative analysis of inter-
views with a smaller number of participants to seek understanding of their
17. M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein, “Who Rebels? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War”,
Paper presented to the American Political Science Association annual conference 2006, available:
,www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/weinstein.pdf. (accessed 8 May 2008).
18. M. Florez-Morris, “Joining Guerilla Groups in Colombia: Individual Motivations and Processes
for Entering a Violent Organisation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 7 (2007).
19. G. Seidman, “Guerillas in their Midst: Armed Struggle in the South African Anti-apartheid
Movement”, Mobilization, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2001).
20. P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and D. Rohner, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, Centre
for the Study of African Economies Working Paper 254, available: ,http://www.bepress.com/case/
paper254. (accessed 8 May 2008); J.D. Fearen and D.D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003).
21. C. Cramer, “Homo economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and
the Political Economy of War”, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 11 (2002).
22. Humphreys and Weinstein, op. cit.
100 Nicholas Henry
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:1
2 1
5 J
un
e 2
01
4 
participation in armed conflict.23While these studies have produced thematic ana-
lyses which are rich in personal experiences and insight, the loosely qualitative
nature of the methodology makes the process of getting from data to results some-
what opaque.
This study uses a qualitative method based on semi-structured interviews with
members of both armed and non-armed groups in order to understand the motiv-
ations of each group and the interactions between them. The analysis utilised
Grounded Theory, a method of qualitative analysis which allows a measure of
transparency and repeatability in the process of coding interview data and asses-
sing emergent themes.24
Participants
Participants were selected from social movement organisations with a presence on
the Thai–Burma border. Interviews were conducted in October and November
2006 at various locations including Bangkok and Chiang Mai in Thailand, Thai
border towns such as Mae Sot, Mae Sariang and Sangkla Buri; Mae La Oo
refugee camp; and one site on the border of Karen state controlled by the Karen
National Union (KNU). Interviews were sought with a range of high-profile
organisations and others recommended by contacts. The sample used in this
study consisted of 27 interviews across 17 organisations. These included
women’s groups, student and youth organisations, ethnic-based political groups
and trade unions. Where possible, interviews were conducted with activists and
grassroots members of the groups as well as with leaders and spokespeople.
The sample included members and leaders of student and youth, women’s,
trade union and ethnic groups. The organisations in the sample represent a
range of large and small ethnic constituencies in Burma, including Karen,
Kachin, Mon, Palaung and pan-Burmese organisations. Of the organisations in
the study, five are armed groups or have an armed wing, while twelve have a
policy commitment to non-violence.
Procedure
Interviews were semi-structured and based on a set of questions covering the
goals and actions of the groups, as relating to their community, other organisations
and the state regime. Participants were asked to describe the most important goals
of their organisation, their personal reasons for involvement and the issues for
their community. They were also asked about the activities of the group, what
support they had received and what further actions they thought were needed
to achieve the change they wanted to see. In addition, participants were asked
whether they felt their goals and activities were understood and supported by
other groups including international NGOs.
Where translation was used, this was usually done by peers from the groups
concerned. This kind of amateur translation involved some loss of precision,
23. Florez-Morris, op. cit.; R. Brett and I. Specht, Young Soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2004).
24. J. Corbin and A. Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing
Grounded Theory (London: Sage, 1998).
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but allowed participants to talk more freely than would have been the case if using
local translators who were unknown to the participants. Issues of confidentiality,
consent and use of information were covered in a written and spoken briefing.
Interviews were recorded, then transcribed and manually coded using Nvivo
computer software.
Analysis
Coding followed the process of grounded theory as outlined by Strauss and
Corbin.25 In the initial phase of open coding, transcripts were coded at the level
of meaning expressed by the participant. The ideas or points expressed in the
interview were paraphrased as closely as possible into “meaning units”. The
second phase of open coding involved abstracting each statement and grouping
together like statements into “second-order categories”. As with the first phase
of coding, an attempt was made to base the coding on the original meaning
expressed, even as it was abstracted out of its original specific context and
related to other statements. In this way, as concepts and categories emerged
through the interpretation of the researcher they also remained grounded in the
expressed experiences of the participants. Depending on length, an interview
transcript typically generated around 60 coded statements at the initial phase of
open coding. During the second phase these statements were grouped together
and added to existing “second-order categories”, or a new category was added.
As each interview was analysed, fewer new categories were required, until a
more-or-less saturated coding model was developed, consisting of 95 distinct cat-
egories. The next phase of “axial coding” involved sorting these second-order cat-
egories into broad groups, based on patterns emerging from the categorisation
and interpretation of statements.
Results
Statements coded from interviews in the sample were grouped into categories of:
needs; lacks; problems; motivations; and relationships. Aspects of these categories
relating to the themes of political violence and non-violence are summarised
below.
Needs
Some participants expressed an explicit need for their group to hold arms in the
current situation. The reasons given were to continue to fight for the aims and
objectives of the group, to be able to continue political work and access to infor-
mation from inside the country, and to protect or defend people in border areas.
Participants also expressed a need for international understanding of their need
to hold arms for self-defence and in pursuit of their goals. A common sentiment
was expressed by a member of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front
(ABSDF): “when they come after us with guns, we need the guns to defend our-
selves. I think if people come and talk to us and see the situation, they will
25. Ibid.
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understand that.” Others expressed frustration at the lack of international support
or funds for groups that hold arms. Members of armed groups in the study
thought that they deserved the support of global civil society because they felt
they were fighting for democratic change and for the benefit of the people.
As one ABSDF member put it, “the international groups like NGOs, civil
society, if they really want to change Burma they need to support armed struggle
effectively”.
The needs to hold weapons and to seek international support for armed
struggle were expressed by members of the armed groups rather than those
from non-armed groups. However, when discussing what forms of action were
needed, participants from both armed and non-armed groups expressed
support for a combination of tactics, including political mobilisation inside
Burma, armed struggle and international pressure on the regime. Statements
coded under this category emphasised that different groups could work together
towards the same ends by different means and that this could include both
non-violent and armed actions. One women’s group member stated that armed
and non-armed groups worked together on various campaigns and joint action
committees, including seminars for youth dialogue and on issues of democracy,
national reconciliation and federal union. “Our beliefs are the same, we have a
common goal, although we are using different strategies. So we are working
together all the time.” Asked whether she thought that outside organisations
would understand the need to work with armed groups, she said that this
should not be confusing to observers who understood the complexity of the situ-
ation as well as the common goals of the groups. Another women’s groupmember
thought that working towards a people’s movement inside Burma was the most
effective strategy for change, but because the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) regime had broken ceasefire agreements, people should be able
to fight back when attacked.
Members of armed groups in the sample also expressed their support and
preference for a range of non-violent forms of action. These included expression
of the need for more international awareness and pressure on the regime, the
need for a grassroots people’s movement inside Burma and the need for a political
solution to the conflict, leading to reforms. Spokespeople for armed groups
wanted more international awareness of the situation and suffering of people in
Burma and to counter the “propaganda” of the SPDC regime. A spokesperson
for the New Mon State Party (NMSP), which includes an armed wing, expressed
appreciation for academic researchers who had worked in the area and brought
the existence and struggles of the Mon people to the world’s attention. Partici-
pants from armed groups also emphasised their need for international support.
One spokesperson stated that raising international awareness and support for
political change in Burma was the most important goal of his organisation and
the primary purpose of its presence in Thailand. Another emphasised the need
for humanitarian assistance to people in conflict areas, arguing that with more
food, medical care and education people would have more energy and ability
to engage in non-violent forms of political action. Members of both armed and
non-armed groups discussed international awareness-raising and networking as
potential sources of financial and human resources for their groups. For instance,
a soldier from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) said that he hoped
that people who heard about the situation in Karen state through this study
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would be able to come to the area and help in some way. One women’s group
member said: “when other people know about what is happening inside . . . we
got donations or people want to come and help”. Members of women’s, youth
and student organisations also discussed the strength of international networks
that allowed them to participate in international campaigns and learn from
other organisations. Participants from both armed and non-armed groups
expressed a need for peace in their country. One participant from an armed
group, when asked what he would like to see change in Burma, said that he did
not want there to be a lot of armed organisations and wanted the people to be
able to live in peace.
All members of armed groups in the sample said that more international
pressure on the regime in Burma was needed. Pressure was seen as needed to
persuade the regime to enter into dialogue, to respect human rights and to give
up power. Support was consistently expressed for “tripartite dialogue” between
armed ethnic groups, the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the SPDC
regime. Participants supported international pressure towards these goals in the
form of action by the UN Security Council, diplomatic pressure by states and sanc-
tions on Burmese military and business interests. No support was expressed for
outside military intervention, with one participant saying supporting this
would be “quite crazy”. Participants from both armed and non-armed groups
supported a political solution to current armed conflicts through dialogue and
political reforms leading to civilian rule, multi-party democracy and equal
rights for all ethnic groups.
Lacks
Statements from participants relating to things that their groups and communities
lack can be seen as both causes and consequences of armed conflicts. Participants
across the different groups identified a lack of education and economic opportu-
nities in their communities, as well as ethnic and gender discrimination in these
areas. Participants from non-Burman ethnic communities felt that they lacked
political power and rights. Women also faced a lack of power over their lives, in
the form of abuses such as rape by members of the military and forced prostitu-
tion. Women also lacked control over marriage and were expected to support
their men during armed conflict while also looking after children and family
members.
A lack of international awareness, understanding or support was expressed by
several participants from both armed and non-armed groups. However, members
of armed groups reported a more widespread lack of support than members of
non-armed groups. Participants who felt their groups lacked international
support attributed this to various factors including isolation, lack of information
sharing, lack of contacts and international interest in national politics rather
than minority interests. These concerns were expressed by members of the
armed groups as well as members of the smaller, less well-known non-armed
groups, such as the Kachin organisation’s women’s and youth organisations. In
addition, members of armed groups felt that they lacked international support
and understanding owing to a widespread opposition to armed struggle and
political violence. Armed groups in the sample have long struggled to access
any international assistance, including humanitarian assistance or support for
104 Nicholas Henry
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:1
2 1
5 J
un
e 2
01
4 
their education and health departments. When the ABSDF was in the early stages
of organising students fleeing state repression in the late 1980s, emergency food
supplied by international NGOs was restricted to rice and fish paste and supplied
only to non-combatants. The group survived by trading rice for other food
supplies and sharing half-rations between armed and non-armed members.
Later, the group managed to access some aid funding to assist in setting up
education and health programs for refugees on the border. But in 2001, this
funding too was cut, with USAID withdrawing support. Group members inter-
viewed felt that this indicated a changing international attitude against armed
groups, which was confirmed by the declaration of the “war on terror”. A spokes-
person for the KNU also linked a lack of recognition from international groups
and governments to a perception that armed groups were linked to terrorism.
This was due, in his opinion, to a lack of understanding of the causes of conflict:
when you talk about arms, some of the westerners think that you’re from
the other side, like you’re from the terrorist group. But we have to explain
to them why we hold arms. From the very beginning, people don’t want
to hold arms. All the ethnic groups from the early days, they would like to
solve the problem by democratic ways. But when you are forced to come
to this solution, I think all the ethnic groups started with this struggle. To
get the support, we have to explain to them the atrocity that our people
[are] facing in our homeland, the discrimination that our people [are]
facing.
Interestingly, this participant reported that similar attitudes had initially been
encountered from students from the Burman majority ethnic group and other
political refugees fleeing repression in the cities after the military crackdown in
1988. He felt that some people were wary of working with armed groups
because of government propaganda that ethnic armed groups were terrorists.
Only once they had stayed for a while at the border and seen that the armed
groups were there “only to defend their community, [and] defend themselves”
did they understand and support the need to hold arms. This explanation links
the lack of international support for armed groups to a lack of awareness and
understanding of the situation for their communities, the causes of the conflicts
and the motivations for armed resistance.
Problems
Problems which were explicitly identified by participants as causes of armed
conflict included government denial of ethnic rights and refusal to listen to
minority voices, government attacks on community leaders, government reneging
on agreements, ineffectiveness of peaceful protest and desperation caused by
poverty and a lack of alternative forms of resistance. Many of these problems,
like the conflicts they are linked to, go back 50 years or more to the political
struggles of post-independence Burma. Specific grievances which sparked conflict
included the 1948 disbanding of ethnic-based military units such as the Karen
Rifles, the lack of promised Karen and Mon states in the independent Union of
Burma, and the 1961 government suppression of the traditional Palaung royalty.
The 1988 student conflict with the regime which preceded the formation of the
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ABSDF had been sparked by a heavy police response to a fight in a Rangoon tea
shop. When students protested, demanding an official investigation, the state
responded with further violence and protests escalated. When the military
intervened and crushed the protests many students fled to the jungle and took
up arms. Participants described an ongoing political crisis in the 1980s as the
Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) regime maintained a one-party
system and a socialist ideology that was in conflict with government practice,
while enforcing order with “draconian censorship laws” and arrest of people
who criticised the government. Members of each armed group cited a lack of
consultation or unwillingness to listen on the part of successive regimes as
causes of the ongoing and unresolved armed conflicts.
The perceived impossibility of working with the regime was also identified as a
problem by participants from non-armed groups. Members of women’s groups
felt that they were hated by the regime for exposing the abuses of women by
members of the military and for their criticisms of the regime. Members of the
groups had been blacklisted and forced to flee the country. It was felt that any
contact with the regime was dangerous. Participants from groups that had
produced reports on social problems in Burma did not believe that this would
be heeded by the regime or have an effect on policy.
Participants reported widespread anger with the regime. In the cities this
“anger” and “bad feelings” towards the government was caused by decisions
such as the cancellation of certain banknotes in 1987 which instantly impoverished
many people, as well as by political repression and violence towards protesters. In
rural areas, resentment of local BSPP authorities was exacerbated by poverty,
economic restrictions and widespread corruption. One participant from Karen
state said that this situation made the people “desperate to fight for their
freedom in terms of political freedom, economic freedom”. Another participant,
from Kachin state, said that most people learnt to both fear and oppose govern-
ment and local authority officers from the first time they encountered them:
“Because always the SPDC threaten with the gun to the civilian or local people,
so they are afraid of that weapon, but in their mind they know what they
should do.”
A range of abuses by the military regime was catalogued by participants across
all groups in the sample. Recent army offensives and expansion of military bases
in the border area, especially in Karen state, had caused villagers to be confined to
their homes or forcibly relocated and cut off from their fields and food supplies.
Others had been forced to flee their homes, hiding in the jungle or crossing the
border into Thailand. Various participants from Karen and Kachin states reported
an increase in forced labour, conscription and extortion by military authorities to
fund the expanded military presence in those areas. Groups from Mon state
reported that despite a ceasefire with the military regime, people continued to
suffer forced labour and relocation and other human rights violations including
rape and killings. Participants from all women’s groups reported widespread
rape by soldiers, which they believed was sanctioned by the military authorities
and used as a weapon of war against their communities. The regime was also
blamed for involvement in drug trafficking and creating the conditions for wide-
spread drug addiction, especially among young people in Kachin state. These
abuses and the resentment and resistance they engender can be seen as both
cause and consequence of armed conflict.
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Communities experiencing this kind of military onslaught faced seemingly
impossible choices between resistance and surrender. Participants discussed pro-
blems with both armed resistance and the ceasefire agreements that many armed
ethnic groups have signed with the central government. Armed resistance was
seen as leading to further loss of life, abuse of human rights and damage to prop-
erty. Fighting was seen to hurt innocent people and cause suffering. Resistance
was also seen as unlikely to succeed, given the superior firepower of the military
regime. The difficulties of armed struggle were furthered by a lack of weapons
and international support. Global trends such as the end of the Cold War and
the declaration of a “war on terror” were cited as reasons for this. The difficulties
of continued resistance have led many armed groups to sign ceasefire agreements
with the regime. As one participant from Kachin state put it:
Most of the armed groups, why they start to get a ceasefire with the SPDC
is that any armed organisation faces a lot of problems. Most of your local
people shot dead by SPDC. For example, here is maybe one brigade
settled in the region, but in the region most are local people living. So
the SPDC came to fight them several times, but the local people could
not resist them anymore. They have lack of food, lack of health . . . So
finally the ethnic armed groups know their local people face a problem
and they start to get ceasefire with the SPDC.
Several participants criticised existing ceasefire agreements as “not genuine” or a
“false peace”. Reasons given were that ethnic groups had been forced to accept the
ceasefire, that the ceasefire did not address the underlying causes of conflict or
political reforms and that expansion of military bases and abuses of the people
had continued. These concerns were expressed by both armed and non-armed
groups. In this context, even groups with a principled commitment to non-
violence were not in favour of disarming the non-state armed groups. As one
women’s group member said:
I think to disarm them is not, I mean it is very difficult. Because they are
standing where they are to protect their people, not that they love fighting
or for themselves. They think that this is the way to protect the people. So I
think that would be difficult.
Differences of opinion over the question of ceasefire agreements had caused
division amongst the opposition groups. One participant reported arguments
between supporters and opponents of the ceasefires as a divisive issue at youth net-
working meetings. Another expressed the criticisms that ceasefire groups were
more interested in “getting rich” and maintaining their own local authority than
in working towards democracy or co-operating with other opposition groups.
Disagreement with the decision of the Palaung State Liberation Organisation
(PSLO) to sign a ceasefire was the founding moment for the Palaung State Liber-
ation Front (PSLF) to break away from its “mother organisation” and to
“continue to fight for our aim and objectives as we have laid down”. However,
the ceasefire in Palaung state has made it difficult for the PSLF to continue the
armed struggle, as it was cut off from communications, arms and recruits.
Similarly, theABSDF has found its operations in Kachin andKaren states restricted
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following the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) ceasefire and the 2004
“gentlemen’s agreement” between the regime and the KNU. Mon organisations
have had difficulties with a ceasefire agreement that forbids political activity or
contact with outside organisations. Members of the organisations active inside
Mon state said the ceasefire had made it harder for them to express their opinions
freely or organise protests. It was difficult to deal with other organisations and they
had to very careful when arranging meetings or contact.
Several participants from both armed and non-armed groups expressed a belief
that armed struggle could not solve their problems. For some participants from
non-armed groups this was expressed as a commitment to “peaceful ways to
get change” and a hope that negotiation to end the conflicts would be possible.
Others, from armed groups, saw the armed struggle as a legitimate last resort,
but never as a full solution. This attitude was expressed in similar terms to state-
ments expressing a need for a combination of tactics and for a political solution to
the conflicts. But for some, the unpopularity of the armed struggle was something
they were reluctant to accept. These participants felt that a commitment to the
armed struggle was the best contribution they could make to political change in
Burma and felt frustrated that they were unable to take effective action. Partici-
pants from groups engaged in armed struggle expressed difficulty in finding
other ways of pursuing their political objectives, given the lack of international
support for the non-violent activities of their organisations, such as education
and training.
Motivations
Both armed and non-armed groups were involved in a wide range of actions in
response to their needs, lacks and problems. Whether or not they were also
involved in armed activities, each group engaged in community organising,
collecting information and documentation, forming alliances and relationships
with other groups, international lobbying, training and education programmes
and providing other social services including health services. The motivations
discussed by participants for the activities they were engaged in also showed
similarities across both armed and non-armed groups.
Motivations for participants’ involvement in armed struggle included defence of
themselves and their communities, to allow them to continue other activities, to
fight for liberation or political change, to resist abuses by the military, to be taken
seriously by the regime, because there was no alternative and because the prospect
of surrender was worse. Members of armed groups felt they had a duty to protect
people from their communities which were under attack from the military regime.
Armed organisationswere also able to access areaswhichwould be unsafewithout
armed protection. This has allowed them to continue other non-violent activities,
including collecting information, political organising and training. As one armed
group member explained: “Sometimes in the jungle, we did the training, some of
the human rights training, community organising training, but we need to hold
the arms for their security.”Anothermotivation forparticipation in armedactivities
was to fight for political change. Twoparticipants described this in terms of fighting
for liberation from oppression and for self-determination. Another described his
motivation for joining the armed struggle as having leverage to change the political
system. One participant from a non-armed group felt that the armed groups were
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motivated by a desire for equality and freedom and that a transition to democracy
would end the conflict. It was felt by several participants that it was necessary to
hold arms to be taken seriously by the current regime, in order to bring them to
dialogue on political issues. A similar analysis was expressed by armed group
participantswho felt theyhadno alternative but to take uparms tofight for political
change. These participants saw the armed resistance as a sign of desperation, but
also as a way that they could be involved in the struggle. This view was expressed
by one armed group member who had participated in the protests of 1988, which
had shown that “peaceful expressionwas not effective to change the government”.
The state crackdownonpeaceful protestwas akeymoment for eachof themembers
of the ABSDF, who described having discussed the possibility of a military coup
and making secret plans in that event to join the armed struggle of ethnic groups
on the border. Others had been motivated to join armed groups to fight against
ethnic discrimination or a lack of “ethnic rights”, because the regime had attacked
their communities and leaders and because of desperate poverty. In the current
situation, participants felt that to give up the armed strugglewould be to surrender
to the military regime and that it was necessary to keep their arms to defend them-
selves and their communities, “to have space to live”.
Participants from non-armed groups were motivated in similar ways to oppose
discrimination and abuses by the regime against their communities, as well as by
support from their community, family involvement and to further their own
education and experience. Some participants expressed motivations that were
specific to non-violent actions, including being inspired by the example set by
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a personal commitment to peace, a belief that non-
violent pressure and dialogue were the best ways to achieve change and a recog-
nition of greater global support for non-violent activity.
The role of armed struggle in the opposition movement was a controversial
issue and a matter of active debate for groups in the study. In small focus group
interviews with members of the Burmese Women’s Union (BWU) and the
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), the question of violent versus
non-violent action was the issue that generated the most contentious discussion
and disagreement in both interviews. The BWU, which has a policy commitment
to non-violence, was originally formed to push for gender equality inside the
student guerrilla movement and includes members with a range of views and
experiences of armed struggle, including current members of the ABSDF. As
one of the group’s leaders explained:
we can’t say that everyone accepts non-violence or armed group support.
For example, we all based on the ABSDF members, then we believed that
gender equality [was the work] we needed to do, there was a bad situation
that we needed to change. That is why our policy is on gender equality and
mostly by peaceful non-violent action, but politically we have different
views.
Relationships
Participants discussed the relationships their groups had formed with both their
own communities and other organisations. Participants from both armed and
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non-armed groups expressed opinions that armed groups were supported by
their communities. One women’s group member said that
for the people who are inside [Burma], they feel like they still have people
to protect them and it would be worse if they are not present there. For
example if the military comes to attack them and if there is a guerrilla
group [to] try to intervene, try to stop, even though they cannot protect
them completely, they still feel like they try to defend them, so they
have time to run away.
Kachin participants, all from non-armed groups, said that the KIO had enjoyed
broad community support since its formation, with one saying “the KIO is the
heart of our Kachin people”. Although the KIO had signed a ceasefire with the
regime, it was still seen as providing a buffer against SPDC troops. The spokesper-
son for the PSLF said that from the time of its formation, until signing a ceasefire
with the regime, the PSLO had received “100 percent support from the Palaung
people to make activity for the Palaung revolution movement and even to join
with Shan, join with Kachin, join with Communists sometimes, we fight our
common enemy, what we now call SPDC”. This support was seen as arising
from community organising, creating a recognition that the community and the
organisation were mutually reliant on each other. Similarly, the KNU was seen
as the legitimate representatives of the Karen people by both armed and non-
armed groups. Their spokesperson said that the organisation relied almost
entirely on community support: “through the whole struggle we didn’t get any
support from outside, we only got support from our own Karen people from
inside”. Ethnic armed groups typically took on state functions in areas under
their control, providing for the health, education and welfare of their people. A
spokesperson for the New Mon State Party said that the armed group “is acting
as a political party in Mon state. But while they are doing that, they also have a
responsibility for the people in Mon state, for their education, for their health,
for their development.”
Participants from armed groups in the sample reported that their organisations
had formed alliances and worked co-operatively with each other, as well as with
non-armed groups. The ethnic armed groups had initially formed the National
Democratic Front in 1976 to co-ordinate their armed struggles for self-determi-
nation. In 1988 an expanded alliance was formed to incorporate the newly
formed ABSDF, as well as other groups including the Federation of Trade
Unions of Burma, under the name Democratic Alliance of Burma. In 1992 these
organisations came together with the National League for Democracy (Liberated
Area) to form the National Council of the Union of Burma.26 Ethnic armed groups
tended to have close working relationships with the non-armed women’s and
youth groups from the same communities. Similarly, the Burmese Women’s
Union was formed by female members of the ABSDF and, although the
women’s group was committed to non-violence, the two organisations main-
tained some overlapping membership.
26. National Council of the Union of Burma, “Members of the National Council of the Union of
Burma”, available: ,http://www.ncub.org/MembersofNCUB.htm. (accessed 30 September 2007).
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Participants from the ABSDF considered the group to be part of civil society in
Burma, considered to be “based on civilians, the people and the public” and the
self-organisation of the community. Examples given of civil society activity in
Burma were village committees to organise social events, or volunteering time
at Buddhist temples. ABSDF members considered their group to be part of civil
society by virtue of their social service activities for health and education, as
well as by the support they received from the community.
Conclusion
The existing literature on the relationship between global civil society and political
violence has tended to assume a clear division between the two. On the one hand,
global civil society actors are assumed to be committed to non-violence and are
seen as a legitimate force for global political change. On the other, non-state
armed groups are identified with the unrestrained violence of “uncivil” or
“network” wars and are not seen as legitimate political actors. However, it is
evident from the results of the empirical research discussed in this paper that
participants were not making such stark divisions between groups that have a
commitment to non-violence and those that hold arms. The question of whether
violence by non-state groups is acceptable was found to be not one but several
questions, relating to both principled belief and to strategic choices in complex
situations. Answers to these questions of the legitimacy of violence were not
always dependent on whether the participant was a member of an armed or
non-armed group.
Participants discussed their situation and activities in terms of specific problems
faced by their communities, what they needed and lacked. Motivations for group
actions and relationships were similarly based on understandings grounded in the
situation of the community. In discussing their needs, lacks, problems, motiv-
ations and relationships there was more that united than divided the participants
from armed and non-armed groups. To the participants, the tactics or means that a
group used to resist were not usually the most important signifiers of inclusion
within the bonds of trust and association sometimes identified as civil society.
Rather, a demonstrated commitment to responding to the needs and problems
of the community, motivated by a concern for the collective interest, was generally
a more important criterion for inclusion in relationships of co-operation among
opposition groups. Based on the close analysis of the Burmese opposition move-
ment presented in this paper, it is evident that participants in both armed and non-
armed groups shared a large degree of common experience and understanding of
their political goals and activities. The web of mutual recognition between armed
and non-armed organisations in this context is so dense that an analytical
distinction between the two seems more of a barrier than an aid to understanding
the situation. If an analytical distinction is to be maintained between global
civil society and armed organisations, it must be recognised that in practice
there is often considerable overlap between the two. However, for situations of
social conflict of the kind discussed in this paper, it may be more fruitful to
consider both armed and non-armed organisations as participants in global civil
society.
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